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When subjects are presented with the Arizona whale–kangaroo, an ambiguous figure, percep-
tion of the whale is more common than perception of the kangaroo. however, this difference 
is smaller in Australian than American subjects. Perception of the kangaroo is more orientation 
dependent than perception of the whale, which is perceived at all orientations of the stimulus. 
together with the difference between subject populations, this effect reveals an influence of 
past experience on the perception of this new ambiguous figure. Perception of the whale versus 
the kangaroo differs in both reconstrual of parts and realignment of the object- centered refer-
ence frame. observers report reference frame reconstruals before reference frame reversals, 
shedding light on the organization of object memory.
KeyWords: perception, ambiguous figures, reversible figures, bistable figures, multistable fig-
ures, form perception, shape recognition, object recognition, orientation, past experience, cat-
egory clustering, culture and perception
Ambiguous, reversible, or multistable figures, a class 
of visual phenomena of which the oldest and best 
known is Necker’s cube (Necker, 1832; see also Ho-
chberg & Peterson, 1987; Peterson & Hochberg, 
1983), have long held an important place in the psy-
chology of perception (e.g., Attneave, 1971; Fisher, 
1968a; Palmer, 1999; Porter, 1938). Other familiar 
examples are the duck–rabbit, introduced by Jastrow 
(1899) and popularized by Wittgenstein (1953/1958) 
and Gombrich (1960); and the chef–dog, introduced 
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by Rock (1956), based on the earlier clown–seal fig-
ure of Gibson and Robinson (1935). Large sets of 
ambiguous figures have been provided by Fisher 
(1967c, 1968a) and Lindauer and Baust (1974). Fish-
er (1967b) has also provided methodological notes 
on constructing and evaluating ambiguous figures 
(see also Porter, 1938; Price, 1969). For thorough 
reviews of reversible figures and their theoretical 
implications, see Long and Toppino (2004; see also 
Kornmaier & Bach, 2012; Leopold & Logothetis, 
1999; Sterzer, Kleinschmidt, & Rees, 2009; Wimmer 
& Doherty, 2011).
 Because the perceived image changes while the 
pattern of proximal stimulation remains unchanged, 
reversible figures are often taken as evidence for the 
contribution to perception of nonstimulus factors, 
including such central, top- down cognitive process-
es as expectation, intention, interpretation, memory 
for past experience, and perceptual problem solv-
ing (Gregory, 1970, 1974; Hochberg, 1968, 1978; 
Hochberg & Peterson, 1987; Peterson, 1993, 1994; 
Peterson & Gibson, 1994a, 1994b; Peterson & Ho-
chberg, 1983; Rock, 1975, 1983, 1985). These factors 
operate in the context of other factors that contribute 
to reversal, such as neural fatigue (e.g., Kohler, 1940; 
Peterson & Hochberg, 1983) and the presentation of 
specific cues (Jensen & Mathewson, 2011).
 When considering ambiguous or reversible fig-
ures, it is important to distinguish between two as-
pects of reversibility (Peterson, Kihlstrom, Rose, & 
Glisky, 1992). In reference frame realignments there 
is a change in object- centered directions, such as top 
versus bottom or front versus back. An example is the 
Necker cube, whose edges and corners remain edges 
and corners, no matter which way the cube is facing. 
In reconstruals, by contrast, a new interpretation is 
assigned to the components of the figure while the 
reference frame remains unchanged. Reversing the 
duck–rabbit stimulus in Figure 1 entails both a refer-
ence frame reversal (e.g., the front of the duck is the 
back of the rabbit) and a reconstrual of parts (e.g., the 
duck’s bill becomes the rabbit’s ears). Peterson et al. 
(1992) found that subjects typically report reconstru-
als of the duck–rabbit before they report reference 
frame reversals, especially when reporting reversals 
of a mental image of duck–rabbit.
the Arizona Whale–Kangaroo
In the course of previous research (Kihlstrom, Glisky, 
Peterson, & Harvey, 1991; Peterson et al., 1992), we 
began to look for ambiguous figures elsewhere (for a 
similar experience with the duck–rabbit, see Shepard, 
1990). An interesting example appeared in a mobile 
of whales purchased at the Monterey Bay Aquarium 
(designed and manufactured by Jane Boyd Designs, 
P.O. Box 468, Point Reyes Station, CA 94956). One 
whale in particular, actually a humpback (Megaptera 
novaeangliae), swimming downward and to the right, 
when viewed in silhouette seemed to reverse into a 
kangaroo hopping to the left. We named this figure 
the Arizona whale–kangaroo (AWK). Figure 2 pres-
ents the final drawing of the figure, with smoothing 
FIguRe 1. schematic version of the duck–rabbit reversible figure popularized 
by Wittgenstein (1953/1958) and Gombrich (1960). inset: the original figure pub-
lished by Jastrow (1899)
FIguRe 2. the Arizona whale–kangaroo (AWK), shown in 135° 
orientation. inset: the original whale figure, from the mobile
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of the original whale’s hump and flipper and length-
ening of its snout to better suggest a kangaroo’s tail; 
the original mobile figure is in the inset. Reversing 
between whale and kangaroo entails both a reference 
frame reversal (e.g., the front of the whale is the back 
of the kangaroo) and a reconstrual of parts (e.g., the 
snout of the whale is the tail of the kangaroo).
PReLIMInaRY stuDY: PeRCePtIons  
oF tHe WHaLe–KangaRoo
Our first experiment was simply a pilot study in-
tended to describe the AWK figure and document 
the various interpretations given for it.
method
subjects
After giving their consent, a total of 149 American 
college students participated in this experiment to 
partially fulfill the requirements for their introductory 
psychology class.
stimulus materials
The AWK stimulus figure was drawn in black ink on 
a white page oriented so that the whale’s snout was 
pointed at 120° (or 4:00).
Procedure
Before the subjects were presented with the stimulus 
figure, they were read the following instructions:
I’m going to show you a picture of an ambigu-
ous figure. An ambiguous figure is a figure that 
can represent more than one thing. Please look 
at the picture and then list all the things it looks 
like to you.
The subjects were then shown the figure printed at 
the top of a sheet of paper and given 5 min to list their 
interpretations in the order that they came to mind.
results And discussion
Four judges separately determined the top and bot-
tom, and front and back, of each of the subjects’ inter-
pretations. Percepts specified by at least three judges 
to be in the same reference frames as the whale or the 
kangaroo were grouped into the same categories as 
these percepts (in most cases there was total agree-
ment).
 In scoring subjects’ within- reference frame re-
sponses, we counted a number of alternative inter-
pretations, such as dolphin, shark, seal, fish, sea lion, 
sea otter, walrus, and manta ray as equivalent to the 
“whale” percept and fox, dog, rabbit, animal run-
ning, squirrel, cat, lion, and bear fetish (this from 
one of our Native American subjects) as equivalent 
to the “kangaroo” percept. These alternatives were 
deemed equivalent to whales and kangaroos because 
they preserved the same object- centered reference 
frame (top/bottom, front/back), the same general se-
mantic category (sea animals, four- footed animals), 
and the same component parts (fins, feet) as the tar-
gets. Although these interpretations may represent 
a reconstrual of parts without a reference frame re-
alignment, we were unable to distinguish between a 
true perceptual reconstrual and a mere relabeling of 
a part (or the whole figure) in the absence of a genu-
ine perceptual change. In the absence of evidence 
that whales, dolphins, and other sea animals were 
perceptually different, we counted these responses 
as equivalent percepts in this study (i.e., we did not 
consider them reconstruals). We mention these inter-
pretations here so that the reader can understand that 
the AWK figure affords more than the two interpreta-
tions designated by its name.
 Every subject saw the whale or an equivalent 
percept; by contrast, only 85 subjects (57%) saw the 
kangaroo or the equivalent. In addition to these target 
percepts, subjects often offered alternative percepts 
from the same category, such as dolphin or dog. Table 
1 provides the details.
 Occasionally, subjects offered other interpreta-
tions of the stimulus figure, such as airplane, sub-
marine, and surfboard (for the whale) and bird, bird 
on a branch, penguin, duck, and dinosaur (for the 
kangaroo). These appeared to retain the same refer-
ence frame as the targets but were not counted as 
equivalent because they lay outside the target seman-
tic category and also differed in terms of the identi-
fication of particular features. These nonequivalent 
interpretations were considered within- reference 
frame reconstruals.
 A small number of other interpretations, such 
as chair, were not counted because they did not re-
tain the reference frame of either the whale or the 
kangaroo. These alternative interpretations, which 
involve both realignment and reconstrual, lay outside 
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the target domains of whale and kangaroo and were 
also omitted from further consideration.
 The results of the pilot experiment show that the 
AWK stimulus does support two primary interpreta-
tions—whale and kangaroo—as well as other inter-
pretations within the reference frames of those two 
primary interpretations.
MaIn stuDY: eFFeCts oF oRIentatIon 
anD eXPeRIenCe
In addition to introducing the whale–kangaroo figure, 
the primary purpose of this study was to investigate 
the effects of stimulus orientation and past experi-
ence on its perception. Orientation is important in 
the identification and recognition of unambiguous 
shapes that have a typical orientation (Gibson & Rob-
inson, 1935; Jolicoeur, 1985, 1988; Tarr & Pinker, 
1989). Performance is faster and more accurate when 
the stimuli are viewed in their typical upright ori-
entation rather than disoriented from upright. The 
two objects resembled by the AWK are typically per-
ceived under different conditions. The kangaroo is a 
land animal that is typically perceived with its head at 
the top. The whale is a sea creature that is perceived 
in many different orientations, swimming in the sea 
or leaping out of and diving into the sea. Thus, if ori-
entation affects the perception of ambiguous stimuli, 
the AWK may be differentially ambiguous in different 
orientations. There is a general absence of orientation 
norms for ambiguous stimuli, even those whose re-
versal depends on a realignment of top/bottom speci-
fications. For example, the chef–dog figure is typically 
presented at an orientation that affords some “chef ” 
responses and some “dog” responses (Rock, 1956; 
Rock & Heimer, 1957); to our knowledge, percep-
tion of the chef–dog at other orientations has gone 
undocumented.
 Orientation effects represent a form of past ex-
perience (cf. Peterson, 1994). Another form of past 
experience is the likelihood of having seen an ob-
ject at all. In our preliminary study, it was obvious 
that not all American college students perceived the 
kangaroo or equivalent. It is possible that American 
students’ experience with kangaroos is insufficient 
to affect the perception of this ambiguous stimulus 
for which there is another interpretation. Accord-
ingly, in this experiment we tested both American 
tabLe 1. interpretations Given to the Arizona Whale–Kangaroo in 
Pilot studies With American subjects
Percept % of Subjects
Whale reference frame
equivalent interpretations
 Whale 46.8
 dolphin 60.6
 shark 30.9
 seal 26.6
 Fish 12.8
 sea lion 3.2
 sea otter 4.3
 Walrus 1.1
 manta ray 1.1
nonequivalent interpretations
 Airplane 30.9
Kangaroo reference frame
equivalent interpretations
 Kangaroo 54.3
 Fox 3.2
 dog 3.2
 rabbit 2.1
 Animal running 1.1
 squirrel 1.1
 cat 1.1
 lion 1.0
nonequivalent interpretations
 Bird 4.3
 Bird on a branch 3.2
 Penguin 3.2
 duck 1.1
other reference frame
chair 9.6
miscellaneous: Amoeba, arrow, balloon, bone, 
bottle opener, cactus, cartoon character, cloud, 
coat hanger, cooking tool, corn, cornucopia, eel, 
fin of animal, fishing lure, ghost, golf bag, golf 
hole, Gumby, gun, hair clip, half-dog half-lizard, 
hand, head, island, kite, lake, map, mermaid, 
missile, mouth, piano, platypus, pond, porcupine, 
prongs, puddle, puzzle piece, silly Putty, slug, 
smear of paint, torpedo, tree branch, vacuum 
cleaner, wrench
1.1–4.3 each
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and Australian subjects; the latter have more experi-
ence with kangaroos (and perhaps whales as well) 
than American subjects. If past experience affects 
the interpretation of ambiguous displays, Austra-
lian subjects should be more likely than American 
subjects to perceive the kangaroo or an equivalent 
interpretation.
method
This study was originally planned as an experi-
ment and exact replication, each involving samples 
of American and Australian college students drawn 
from different institutions. Because the results of the 
two experiments were so similar, with only minor 
differences in statistical outcomes, they have been 
combined in this report for ease of exposition.
stimulus materials
A total of 12 different versions of the AWK figure 
were prepared by rotation. For the first version, the 
figure was presented in an exactly vertical orienta-
tion (0°), with the snout of the whale at 12:00, its tail 
at 6:00, and its fin pointing to the right. Successive 
versions were prepared by rotating this figure every 
30° clockwise. The version of the stimulus present-
ed in Figure 1 is positioned at approximately 135°, 
with the whale’s snout positioned between 4:00 and 
5:00. Each subject saw only one version of the figure. 
Figure 3 shows AWK in the 0°, 90°, 180°, and 270° 
orientations.
subjects
The two American samples consisted of 450 under-
graduates at the University of Arizona and another 
494 undergraduates at the University of California, 
Berkeley (combined N = 944). The two Australian 
samples consisted of 491 undergraduates at Macqua-
rie University and 608 undergraduates at the Univer-
sity of New South Wales (combined N = 1,099). At 
all four sites, the subjects participated in the study 
in return for credit toward the research participa-
tion requirement of their introductory psychology 
course. All subjects were run in small groups, each 
group randomly assigned to one of the 12 stimulus 
orientations. At least 61 American and 79 Australian 
subjects viewed each orientation.
Procedure
The procedure was the same as the preliminary ex-
periment, except that in addition, the subjects were 
asked to rate the figure in terms of how convincing 
a rendition it was for each interpretation. Subjects 
used scale ranging from 1 (Not very clear, vaguely re-
sembles the object) to 5 (Very distinct, clearly resembles 
the object).
results
With only four exceptions (all Australian), the whale, 
or some equivalent interpretation, was seen by every 
subject at every orientation (100% of the Americans, 
99.6% of the Australians). By contrast, only 43.7% of 
the subjects saw a kangaroo or its equivalent. Two of 
the Australians who failed to see the whale neverthe-
less saw the kangaroo.
Perception of Whales and Kangaroos
Conceptually, this study was planned as a 2 × 12 × 2 
mixed design with two between- group factors (pop-
ulation: American vs. Australian; orientation: 0° to 
330°) and one within- subject factor (percept: whale 
or kangaroo). However, because almost every sub-
ject saw the whale at every orientation, the primary 
analysis was performed on the kangaroo percept only.
 Not surprisingly, most subjects saw the whale 
first. Of the subjects who also saw the kangaroo, 
more Australians (12.0%) than Americans (5.1%) saw 
it before they saw the whale, χ2(1) = 10.58, p < .001, r 
= .11).
 Figure 4 shows the proportion of subjects in each 
group, at each orientation, who saw the kangaroo or 
FIguRe 3. the AWK stimulus figure used in the main experiment, 
shown in four different orientations (clockwise from top: 0°, 90°, 
180°, and 270°)
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an equivalent percept (as defined in Table 1). There 
was a significant effect of orientation, χ2(11) = 257.17, 
p < .001, r = .30. Subjects were more likely to see the 
kangaroo at 120° and 150° (73% and 74%, respec-
tively) than at the other orientations, χ2(1) = 170.62, 
p < .001, r = .24); arguably, these are the orientations 
that most closely match the typical person’s mental 
image of a kangaroo, derived from pictures of kan-
garoos seen in books, or real kangaroos seen in zoos 
or in the wild. As expected, the Australian subjects 
were more likely than the Americans to see the kan-
garoo overall (54% and 31%, respectively), χ2(1) = 
113.88, p < .001, r = .29. Individual χ2 tests showed 
that the difference between Australian and American 
subjects was significant (p < .05) at every orientation 
except 0°, 120°, and 300° and was especially large at 
30°, 150°, 180°, and 240° (all p < .001, all r > .30). 
The American subjects were most likely to see the 
kangaroo at the 120° orientation, χ2(1) = 29.28, p < 
.001, r = .18. By contrast, the Australians were most 
likely to see the kangaroo at the 150° orientation, χ2(1) 
= 66.97, p < .001, r = .16.
resemblance ratings
Figure 5 shows the mean resemblance ratings given to 
the whale and kangaroo percepts at each orientation. 
This analysis included only the 887 subjects (292 
Americans and 595 Australians) who saw both the 
kangaroo and the whale. A 2 × 12 × 2 mixed- design 
analysis of variance was conducted with two between- 
group factors (population and orientation) and one 
within- subject factor (percept: whale or kangaroo). 
Overall, the figure was perceived as a more convinc-
ing rendition of a whale than of a kangaroo, M = 3.95 
vs. 3.24, respectively, shown by a significant main 
effect of percept, F(1, 863) = 276.90, MSE = 251.94, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .24. This was to be expected, because 
the figure originated as an image representation of a 
whale. A significant population × percept interaction 
was observed, F(1, 863) = 16.97, MSE = 15.44, p < 
.001, ηp2 = .02. The difference between the resem-
blance ratings assigned to the whale and the kangaroo 
was larger for American students, M = 4.36 versus 
3.27, respectively, F(1, 291) = 228.23, MSE = 170.99, 
p < .001, ηp2 = .12, than for the Australian subjects, 
M = 3.74 versus 3.22, respectively, F(1, 594) = 77.36, 
MSE = 82.33, p < .001, ηp2 = .12).
 A significant percept × orientation interaction, 
F(11, 863) = 4.18, MSE = 3.81, p < .001, ηp2 = .05, was 
also obtained, The whale received fairly high resem-
blance ratings regardless of orientation, F(11, 875) 
= 1.69, ns, whereas the resemblance ratings for the 
kangaroo varied significantly with orientation, F(11, 
875) = 7.82, p < .001. Bonferroni tests showed that 
the kangaroo received its highest resemblance ratings 
at 120°, 150°, and 180°. Main effects of orientation, 
F(11, 863) = 5.56, MSE = 6.60, p < .001, ηp2 = .07); 
and population, F(1, 863) = 22.78, MSE = 26.88, 
FIguRe 4. Proportion of subjects in each group perceiving the kangaroo (almost all subjects saw the whale). error bars represent 95% 
confidence intervals
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p < .001, ηp2 = .03 were subsumed by the interac-
tion effects. The three- way interaction, population 
× orientation × percept, did not approach statistical 
significance, F(11, 863) = 1.34, ns.
organization of Perception
Next, we tested the hypothesis that subjects viewing 
ambiguous figures exhaust reconstruals within a par-
ticular reference frame before reversing the reference 
frame itself (Peterson, 1993; Peterson et al., 1992). 
For example, we predicted that in subjects’ reports, 
whales, dolphins, and even airplanes would be clus-
tered together, as would kangaroos, dogs, and birds.
 This analysis followed procedures established for 
the study of clustering and other forms of organiza-
tion in free recall (Murphy, 1979; Murphy & Puff, 
1982; see also Wilson & Kihlstrom, 1986). A variety 
of measures have been devised for this purpose, and 
each has its advantages and limitations. Our chosen 
measure, the adjusted ratio of clustering (ARC), 
incorporates a correction for chance, but it cannot 
be calculated when subjects report items from only 
a single category, resulting in the loss of some sub-
jects. For ARC, 0 reflects the amount of clustering 
expected by chance, and the index can take a value 
from below 0 (reflecting less than chance levels of 
clustering) to 1.0 (reflecting perfect clustering). The 
analysis used only the subjects run in the 120° and 
150° orientations, which yielded the largest propor-
tion of kangaroo percepts (105 of 106 Americans and 
165 of 174 Australians, for whom ARC scores could 
be calculated).
 The American subjects showed a fairly high level 
of clustering of percepts by reference frame (M = 0.51, 
SEM = 0.08). This value is significantly different from 
0, t(104) = 6.12, p < .001, d = 1.20. Surprisingly, how-
ever, the Australian subjects showed lower levels of 
clustering (M = 0.17, SEM = 0.08). Although even 
this low level of clustering was significantly greater 
than chance, because of the large sample size, t (164) 
= 2.05, p < .05, the effect was much smaller, d = 0.32. 
The group difference in clustering was statistically 
significant, t(268) = 2.82, p < .005, d = 0.36.
discussion
There are essentially four classes of ambiguous fig-
ures. One involves only a reference frame reversal; 
the Necker cube and Schroeder staircase are classic 
examples. Another involves only a figure–ground 
reversal, as with Ruben’s vase. Most ambiguous 
figures involve reconstrual of parts of the figure ac-
companied by either a figure–ground reversal (as in 
Circumference IV and other popular works of artist 
M. C. Escher) or a reference frame reversal (as in the 
duck–rabbit, wife and mother- in- law, and chef–dog). 
Figure 5. mean resemblance ratings (on a 1–5 scale) of the whale and the kangaroo, at each of 12 orientations, based on the American 
and Australian subjects who perceived both objects. error bars represent standard errors
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AWK belongs in this last category. Upon first inspec-
tion, most subjects see a whale: when the reference 
frame reverses, the whale’s snout becomes the kan-
garoo’s tail, its tailfins become a snout and ear, and 
its flipper becomes a leg.
 Not all subjects experience the reversal. Com-
pared with the kangaroo, the whale was seen more 
frequently, was seen earlier, and received higher re-
semblance ratings. This asymmetry, in which the 
whale is more readily perceived than the kangaroo, 
does not impeach the status of the whale–kangaroo 
as an ambiguous figure. Other ambiguous figures are 
also asymmetric, although few of the classic ambigu-
ous figures have been accompanied by the sort of 
normative data provided here. However, systematic 
comparisons of various versions of classic ambiguous 
figures make clear that many of them are not “equi- 
ambiguous” (Fisher, 1967a, 1967b, 1967c, 1968a; see 
also Girgus, Rock, & Egatz, 1977; Mitroff, Sobel, & 
Gopnik, 2006; Peterson, 1993; Peterson et al., 1992; 
Rock & Mitchener, 1992). Adult subjects find it 
easier to see a duck or other bird in most versions of 
the duck–rabbit figure, including Jastrow’s original 
(Brugger, 1999)—except on Easter Sunday, when the 
rabbit strongly prevails (Brugger & Brugger, 1993). 
Introducing a three- aspect version of the “wife and 
mother- in- law” figure, Fisher (1968b) reported that 
41% of the subjects tested failed to see the “daughter” 
as well as the “mother” and “father.”
 Although the whale was seen, and seen with ap-
proximately equal conviction, at all orientations, the 
subjects were most likely to identify the shape as a 
kangaroo when it was at the 120° or 150° orientations. 
These orientations also yielded the highest resem-
blance ratings. Of course, there is a large literature on 
the effects of orientation on the perception of form 
(e.g., Gibson & Peterson, 1994; Jolicoeur, 1985; 
Maki, 1986; Rock, 1974; Tarr & Pinker, 1989; for a 
review, see Peterson & Kimchi, 2013). Observers are 
typically highly accurate in recognizing disoriented 
versions of unambiguous shapes, although recogni-
tion is slower than when shapes are viewed in their 
typical upright. Apparently, a process of normaliza-
tion compensates for stimulus disorientation before 
recognition.
 Why, then, do more subjects not recognize the 
kangaroo regardless of the orientation of the stimu-
lus? Perhaps the likelihood of matching a given rep-
resentation (in this case, the kangaroo) during the 
normalization process depends on other factors in 
addition to the goodness of the depiction. Among 
these relevant factors are the degree to which the 
stimulus matches other representations (in this case, 
the whale), and the likelihood of seeing the depicted 
object in a particular orientation relative to the retinal 
or environmental frame (i.e., people see whales in all 
orientations in their ocean environment but kanga-
roos in their more restrictive terrestrial environment). 
This suggests that in perception, as well as in mental 
imagery, the availability of an interpretation within a 
given reference frame may interfere with perception 
of a construal in another reference frame. Our re-
sults indicate that the availability of an interpretation 
within a given reference frame depends on culture or 
experience.
 This study is the first to identify cultural differ-
ences in the perception of ambiguous figures. Com-
pared with American subjects, Australian subjects 
were more likely to see the kangaroo than were Amer-
icans, and their perceptions were less dependent on 
the orientation of the figure. They were also more 
likely to see the kangaroo before they saw the whale. 
In addition to shedding light on the importance of 
orientation in form perception, then, this research 
underscores the role played in perception by socio-
cultural factors relating to the experiences of the sub-
jects and their familiarity with the objects of regard.
 It seems unlikely that Australians are more prone 
than Americans to neural fatigue, sensory satiation 
and adaptation, and other peripheral or sensory 
factors often assumed to underlie perceptual revers-
ibility. In contrast, they are certainly more familiar 
with kangaroos (real, depicted, and imagined) than 
Americans are. Other investigators have documented 
the effects of experience on perception, but these 
studies have been largely confined to exposures in 
the laboratory (Bugelski & Alampay, 1961; Goolka-
sian, 1987; Leeper, 1935; for an exception, see Pe-
terson & Gibson, 1994a, 1994b). This cultural dif-
ference we report here adds to the growing body of 
evidence that “central,” “cognitive,” and “top- down” 
processes are involved in the resolution of percep-
tual ambiguity. That is, the frequency with which the 
Australian subjects recognize the kangaroo might 
reflect the relative richness of their memory repre-
sentations of that animal. Ambiguity, then, is not just 
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a property of the stimulus figure; it also resides in 
the eye (or the mind) of the beholder, as argued by 
Jastrow (1899) and, more recently, theorists such as 
Gregory (1970). The likelihood of seeing the kanga-
roo depends on structural knowledge embodied in 
the subject’s mental representation of the shape of 
a kangaroo, as well as other factors, both peripheral 
and central, sensory and cognitive. This knowledge, 
in turn, is a product of learning situated in a particu-
lar cultural context.
 In addition to being an interesting (and often 
amusing) class of perceptual stimuli, ambiguous fig-
ures are of interest for what they can tell us about 
perceptual processes more generally. It is central to 
the Helmholtzian constructivist view that stimuli 
are typically ambiguous, in that they can support a 
number of different interpretations. Perception then 
becomes a constructive process of problem solving, 
the problem being to find the best match between 
the features of the stimulus and the features of object 
representations stored in memory.
 The clustering of alternative percepts according 
to reference frame, shown here for the first time via 
cluster analysis, may shed new light on this prob-
lem of perceptual problem solving (cf., Peterson, 
1993; Peterson et al., 1992). Clustering may reflect 
the process of matching the stimulus features with 
the best representation stored in memory. Presented 
with AWK, for example, a subject might first perceive 
the figure as a whale, then as a porpoise, and even 
as an airplane (these are all within- reference frame 
reconstruals), before reversing the percept into a kan-
garoo, then a dog, and even as a bird perched on a 
branch (interpretations within a different reference 
frame). Both groups showed this tendency, although 
the Australians did so less strongly, perhaps because 
their experience with kangaroos led them to reverse 
more readily between the whale and kangaroo refer-
ence frames at the outset. Even if two subjects report 
the same percepts, one who immediately reverses be-
tween the whale and kangaroo reference frames and 
back again will necessarily receive a lower clustering 
score than one who reports several within–reference 
frame percepts before shifting to the other reference 
frame. When viewing ambiguous figures of this sort, 
it seems that perceivers search through candidates 
within a reference frame before reversing the refer-
ence frame and recommencing the search through 
shape memory (cf. Peterson, 1993; Peterson et al., 
1992). Sociocultural differences may well play a role 
in the perception of other ambiguous (and unambigu-
ous) figures where there are clear group differences 
in exposure and experience. But the process of or-
ganized search through shape memory may well be 
universal.
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